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Introduction 
The events of September 11 made it painfully clear that the political, social and 
economic problems of other countries have a direct impact on American national 
security. While the roots of terrorism are complex1, its safe to say that the United 
States was attacked by a terrorist organization that in large part has had great success 
in recruiting new members in nations which offer young men little  political voice and 
limited economic opportunity. 
 
In December 2002, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, speaking before an 
audience at the Heritage Foundation remarked on the emergence of Islamic extremist 
movements: “A shortage of economic opportunities is a ticket to despair. Combined 
with rigid political systems, it is a dangerous brew indeed.”2  
 
 Alan Richards has also noted a common element in extremist movements3: 
 
Radical movements have their greatest appeal when the dislocations of the 
transition to modernity are most acute. Only the slaughter of World War I and 
its chaotic aftermath allowed the Bolsheviks to seize power in Russia. It is 
inconceivable that Hitler would have come to power without the Treaty of 
Versailles and the Great Depression. Famine, governmental collapse and the 
horrors of the Japanese invasion set the stage for China and Chairman Mao 
Tse-tung. The siren song of fanatics becomes most seductive when economic, 
political, social, and cultural crises combine and when people feel that they 
have been repeatedly humiliated. 
 
In the contemporary setting Richards finds “the utopian fanaticism of al-Qa’ida 
and other groups is nourished by the despair of huge numbers of young Middle 
Easterners, half of whom are younger than twenty.”4 Clearly, the current environment 
in the Middle East leading to extremism is extremely complex, composed of economic, 
                                                 
1 For a good overview of the issues see Paul R. Ehrlich and Jianguo Liu, “Some Roots of 
Terrorism,” Population and Environment 24:2 (November 2002). 
2 Colin Powell, speech before the Heritage Foundation, Washington,DC, December 12, 2002. 
3 Alan Richards, “Socioeconomic Roots of Middle East Radicalism,” Naval War College Review 
55:4 (Autumn 2002), p. 22. 
4 Ibid. 
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social, political, and cultural dimensions.5 Additional complexity stems from the fact 
that the socio-economic forces driving radicalism are both internal and external. It is 
internal because of population growth, failed economic policies, local authoritarianism 
and cultural issues. It is external because wider forces of globalization play a critical 
role in stimulating the growth and spread of radicalism. 
 
Much of the region’s economic stagnation derives from its weak and distorted 
integration into the global economy. At the same time, the kinds of integration 
that have occurred—specifically international migration and the spread of  
global communications have themselves contributed to the spread of 
radicalism. Also, in large part, the failure of local regimes stems from a failure 
to manage and engage successfully in the wider process of globalization.6 
 
 In addition to socio-economic factors, a whole spectrum of motivations for 
joining Islamic Fundamentalist groups has been documented in the literature. 
Individuals my join extremist groups to achieve specific political objectives such as 
sovereignty over disputed territory. Emotional incentives may also play an important 
role.  Members of extremist groups often report on the glamour of being members of 
such groups. Unknown, lower-class youth can become famous through their military 
actions, with thousands turning out for their funerals when they are martyred. 
However, “the single most common emotional feature among jihadi militants, 
regardless of their rank is their feeling that they have been humiliated and treated as 
“second class” by government authorities and others—even those jihadis from 
relatively rich countries and advantaged backgrounds.7  
 
Given the myriad of factors enhancing the attractiveness of the extremist 
message to many in the Islamic world, few concrete generalizations can be made for 
the purpose of combating the pull of Islamic extremism.  No doubt the relative 
strength of these factors noted above on the attractiveness of extremism will vary 
considerably from country to country.  Numerous detailed country case studies8 will 
have to be analyzed before any meaningful generalizations can be made.   
 
As a step in this direction, the sections below assess the situation in Iraq. Socio 
economic factors do not get much attention in the vast literature on Iraq – they are a 
long run latent factor and it is difficult to point to them in coming up with an instant 
explanation as to why a certain extremist group did this or that. Or, why extremist 
groups may be expanding in certain areas after months of silence. Still, while a direct 
one-to-one relationship between the deteriorating socio-economic factors and 
extremist recruitment is hard to make, there can be no doubt strong links exist.   
 
                                                 
5 Alan Richards, “At War With Utopian Fanatics,” Middle East Policy 8:4 (December 2001), pp 5-
9. 
6 Richards, op. cit. 
7 “Islamic Extremists: How Do they Mobilize Support?” Special Report 89 (Washington: United 
States Institute of Peace, July 2002). 
8 See for example, Jennifer Bremer and John Kasarda, “The Origins of Terror,” The Milken 
Review (Fourth Quarter 2002), Robert Looney, “Failed Economic Take-Offs and Terrorism in 
Pakistan,” Asian Survey XLIV:6 (November/December 2004). 
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A diagnosis of the country’s economic situation suggests a redirection of its 
economic policies are needed to produce the type of broad-based sustained growth 
necessary to combat the destructive pull of extremist groups in that country. The 
interrelationship between the socio-economic environment and extremism in Iraq is 
complex, but critical to understanding its dynamics is critical in designing a fresh 
approach towards economic development in Iraq. 
The Post-War Development Strategy 
A major problem in designing an economic strategy for Iraq is that the 
country’s economic environment does not fit nicely into a category handled by one of 
the standard development strategies.  In fact, the immediate post-war Iraqi economy 
could conceivably be viewed from a number of perspectives, each encompassing 
certain aspects present today. In this sense Iraq resembles a:  
 
1. Transition economy, similar to those countries in Central and Eastern Europe as 
well as the former Soviet Union. Here the main goals of policy would be the 
establishment of a free market system and the institutions needed to support 
the efficient operation of markets – the creation of a Central Bank, efficient tax 
system, as well as a seamless integration into world markets. Privatization 
would play a key role as well as the adoption of sound macroeconomic policies. 
 
2. Failed State, where the government no longer has the ability to provide basic 
services, maintain law and order, make collective decisions.  Large segments of 
the population have drifted into the informal and criminal markets as a result 
of rapid demographic growth and a stagnant economy9. Particularly important 
are the restoration of an open trading system, resolution of group grievances 
and the halting of economic decline.   
 
3. Rentier Economy, where the economy is overly dependent on the oil sector for 
foreign exchange and government revenues.  Here, economic programs should 
encourage diversification, the development of the agricultural sector and other 
areas where the country had a potential comparative advantage. Because the 
governments of rentier states often are not dependent on the population at 
large for revenues, they tend to evolve into authoritarian regimes, capable of 
buying off or suppressing opposition.  One way to counter these tendencies is 
to establish an oil fund to be distributed to the population at large. The 
transfer of a large percentage of oil revenues to the population not only 
reduces the chance of anti-democratic regimes, but also builds up mass 
purchasing power capable of providing large mass markets for a growing 
private sector. 
 
4. Post-Conflict Economy in which the restoration of physical and social capital 
and supporting institutions is often the main focus, with neoliberal reforms 
postponed until a basic level of stability can be restored.  Community 
                                                 
9 Other characteristics and be found in Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, “The Failed States Index,” 
Foreign Policy 149 (July/August 2005), pp.56-64. 
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development is often the foundation for restoring stability and meeting the 
short-run needs of the population at large. 
 
5. Failed-Take-off Economy in which past successes have raised expectations only 
to be unrealized due to institutional rigidities. Past inability to sustain growth 
however often results in widespread cynicism concerning government policies – 
a environment often exploited by extremist groups.10  Here the introduction of 
increased economic freedom and on-going reforms to create a choice based 
economic system often enables growth to be sustained.  
 
Clearly Iraq possesses elements of each of these economic environments.  
However, given the strong pro market orientation of the Bush administration and is 
aversion at the time to nation building the transition view, especially its shock-Therapy 
variant has dominated U.S. economic policy in Iraq.11  A good case can be made that 
this approach was sound.  The region as a whole has been slow to globalize and 
embrace free markets along the lines suggested by the so-called Washington 
Consensus. Those advocating a neoliberal or Washington Consensus view stress that 
only through a private sector led export oriented economic development strategy will 
the major countries in the region have a chance of coping with the development 
challenges facing the region.12   
 
Perhaps based on the experience in Chile in the 1970s planners in Washington 
assumed that with economic growth quickly restored through the exploitation of 
opportunities in free markets a virtuous circle could be established whereby the early 
winners in the new Iraq would press for further political and institutional reforms – 
thus creating more economic growth and a growing group of entrepreneurs with a 
high stake in pressing for broader and deeper reforms.  
 
A major advantage of shock therapy is that it rapidly reduces the power of 
entrenched groups from the prior regime.   Another reason to opt for this approach is 
that economic reforms are much easier to introduce than changes in basic governance 
structures. As Richards notes, “A strong case can be made that Middle Eastern 
economics have failed thanks to institutional—and political deficiencies. Outsiders can 
do very little to promote institutional change, as the US has learned in Russia and 
elsewhere.13 
 
To this end, in 2003 with Iraq’s economy still shattered following the ouster of 
Saddam Hussein, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) initiated a package of 
neoliberal, free market reforms, discredited in Latin America and  reminiscent of the 
“Shock Therapy” programs carried out in the early- to mid- 1990s in many of the 
                                                 
10 Jennifer Bremer and John D. Kasarda, “The Origins of Terror: Implications for U.S. Foreign 
Policy,” The Milkin Institute Review (Fourth Quarter 2002). 
11 Cf. Robert Looney, “The Viability of Economic Shock therapy in Iraq,” Challenge 47:5 
(September-October 2004), pp. 86-103. 
12 Alan Richards, “Socio-Economic Roots of Radicalism? Towards Explaining the Appeal of 
Islamic Radicals,”  Strategic Studies Institute (July 2003). 
13 Alan Richards, “Socio-Economic Roots of Radicalism? Towards Explaining the Appeal of 
Islamic Radicals,”  Strategic Studies Institute (July 2003). 
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transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe.  Overnight, Iraq became the most 
open economy in the Arab world.   
 
Unfortunately, to date the postwar socio-economic environment along with the 
insurgency has worked to deter private investment and economic recovery.  For every 
bright spot of renewed activity, there are several key areas showing retrogression or 
scant improvement. While the insurgency receives most of the blame for the 
economy’s slow recovery, it’s a chicken and egg situation with post-War economic 
policy a major contributing factor.  
Diagnosis 
1. In retrospect, given the post-War state of affairs in Iraq, adoption of a 
neoliberal/Washington Consensus free market development strategy was a 
mistake.14  While an ideal policy mix in certain situations, as applied in Iraq it 
has gone down a number of dead-ends as a result of serious miscalculations 
and faulty assumptions.  
 
2. By its nature this strategy largely precludes large segments of the population 
from the decision making process – only those with the pre-requisites – the 
proper education, appropriate skills, financial capital to draw on etc. can 
immediately thrive. Few of these skills or assets exist in today’s Iraq.   
 
3. Its main strength is in providing incentives to private investors, but in a conflict 
country like Iraq this is not enough to offset the high level of uncertainty. As 
Stephen Glain as observed “In the relatively peaceful months that followed 
Saddam’s removal, it seemed Iraq would no longer need Jordan as an enclave. 
Two years later, the colony of affluent Iraqis in Amman is a measure of how 
estranged war-town Iraq has become from its private sector.”15  Even in Chile, 
its main success story, several years of difficult restructuring under a very stable 
government occurred before investors felt confident in taking a stake in the 
country’s future. 
 
4. While many have argued that a trade oriented development strategy might 
provide added incentives for the private sector, shifting international markets 
and trade relationships might create added instability through sudden drops in 
the output from industries with limited domestic markets.  Also, it appears that 
reforms in the trade area for countries at Iraq’s stage of development are not 
particularly effective in inducing follow on reforms in key areas of 
governance.16  
                                                 
14 For a detailed description and assessment of the neoliberal reform package in Iraq see: 
Robert Looney, “The Neoliberal Model’s Planned Role in Iraq’s Economic Transformation,” 
Middle East Journal (Autumn, 2003); Robert Looney, “The Viability of Economic Shock Therapy 
in Iraq,” Challenge, 47:5 (September-October 2004), and Robert Looney, “Postwar Iraq’s 
Financial System,” Middle East Policy, XII:1 (Spring 2005). 
15 Stephen Glain, “Land of Tycoons: Many Iraqi Businessmen are Running their Emires form Self 
Exile in Jordan, “ Newsweek (International Edition) June 27, 2005, p. 46. 
16 Robert Looney, “U.S. Middle East Economic Policy: Are Trade Based Initiatives an Effective 
Tool in the War on Terrorism,” Strategic Insights IV:1 (January 2005). 
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5. The neoliberal approach is not evolutionary – when things begin to go wrong, 
there is not an automatic adaptive policy.  In mature economies this adaptation 
is usually through price movements, but in a country coming out of war, 
sanctions and a long history of socialism, a period of institution creation and 
strengthening is necessary before markets can be expected to perform this 
function. 
 
6. As in other parts of the world, the neoliberal program is an easy target for 
radical groups. While in abstract terms, it makes a great deal of sense,  its 
stress on openness to trade and  foreign investment make it an easy target for 
arguments contending that the program is just another form of imperialism – a 
program largely designed for exploitation of weaker countries and groups. The 
extreme form of neoliberalism introduced in Iraq lends considerable credibility 
to these claims as does the initial stress on privatization. 
 
7. The neoliberal philosophy also discourages large scale government intervention 
in the economy.   This, together with market instability, creates high levels of 
uncertainty and the impression that the government is powerless to respond to 
crisis or adversity. As a result, unemployment has stabilized in the 30-40% 
range with large segments of the Iraqi population having a sense of 
hopelessness concerning their futures.  
 
8. The insurgency aside, it is problematical whether the neoliberal reforms would 
have jumpstarted the economy. A large show economy exists, perhaps 
accounting for 65% of Gross National Product and 80% of the labor force. This 
market is largely outside the normal forces of supply and demand, requiring 
specific and directed policies to assure its transition into the regular economy. 
 
9. Transition economies with large shadow economies, but much more favorable 
initial conditions experienced sharp contractions for up to five years after 
introducing even milder reforms. Even under normal circumstances, this would 
have been the likely scenario for Iraq.  
 
10. While one intent of the reforms was to dismantle as quickly as possible 
institutions linked to the previous reform, the neoliberal policies were not, as 
expected, capable of initiating a process of new institutional development. The 
resulting vacuum was largely filled by already organized groups: religious, 
criminal and radical elements. 
 
11. Because the neoliberal reforms were only partially introduced, with a number 
of controls still in effect, significant and sizeable black markets have developed 
-- the most important in petroleum products. The resulting scarcity of fuels has 
had a debilitating effect on several important sectors of the economy. It has 
also lent credibility to extremist claims that the Coalition is only there to 
appropriate Iraqi oil.  
 
12. In effect the economic system to date has been much more efficient at creating 
an environment for criminals and extremist elements to thrive than it has for 
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private investors.  Much of the funding for extremist groups comes from black 
market arbitrage, further enabling their recruitment efforts.  
 
The danger is that the current economic malaise will deteriorate to the 
point where the economy will stabilize in a poverty debt trap (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 








































In short, the performance of the economy and the pain caused by the 
neoliberal reforms extremist groups has no doubt contributed to their recruitment 
efforts in Iraq. After decades of socialism, Iraqis were not ready, nor were they 
properly prepared, for the uncertainties created by a new system. Many Iraqis 
perceived the system as imposed without their consent. The added uncertainty created 
by threats of mass privatizations, high unemployment rates, shortages in key areas, 
and the seeming inability of the government to respond was exploited to the fullest 
extent by the extremists.  
Implications for Extremism 
Still, at this point it is idle to speculate whether the deteriorating economic 
situation is responsible for the increased recruitment by extremist groups or is caused 
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by the increasing terrorist acts performed by these groups. No doubt the deteriorating 
economic situation and rise in the insurgency are interrelated in complex ways. A good 
guess is that the inability of the early economic programs introduced into Iraq to 
address short-run economic needs created an environment easily exploited by 
extremist groups. 
 
Specifying direct links between the deteriorating economic situation an 
extremist recruitment in Iraq is also difficult simply because a multitude of factors are 
at work – some more important for certain individuals, other factors more important 
for different groups.   The development of large numbers of extremist recruits requires 
at least three elements (1) lack of state capacity, particularly in the areas of police, 
intelligence, and law enforcement; (2) a “mobilizing belief,” such as Salafist/jihadist 
extremism; and (3) appropriate agitators who can propagate these ideas and create an 
effective terrorist force.17  Clearly (1) and (3) are present in Iraq with (2) a latent factor 
and the focus of many of the Jihadis infiltrating into the country.   
 
The situation in Iraq is complicated by factors such as ethnic conflicts, a large 
criminal element hold-over from the period of sanctions, pervasive corruption and 
whole spectrum of other contributing factors, some of which are summarized in Figure 
2.  What is fairly certain is that the longer the economy remains incapable of providing 
viable work for large segments, and is seen as incapable of doing so in the future, the 
more attractive extremism will become. 
 
Is the situation hopeless? Middle East expert Ken Pollack feels that the 
deteriorating security situation in Iraq stems from the fact that an effective 
counterinsurgency policy is not in place. “We lost in Vietnam for a complicated set of 
reasons. But the most important was that we refused to use an effective 
counterinsurgency strategy. We focused more on hunting down Vietcong guerrillas 
than on protecting the Vietnam people, which in turn prevented the South Vietnamese 
economy from growing and giving the people an incentive to support our side of the 
war.”18   
 
Pollack finds putting the population first through improving safety is the key to 
counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq.  A people first approach is also critical to restart the 
economy. “Reconstruction is most likely to succeed if it can grow from the bottom up. 
Certainly the top-down approach we are now employing has rarely worked in the 
past…We need to push resources out from Baghdad or circumvent it shipping supplies 
directly into the hands of the Iraqis who can help at the local level.”  Just as in 
Pollack’s case where hunting down the Vietcong guerrillas was a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for success, so too are the neoliberal reforms a necessary, but not 
sufficient set of policies for economic recovery and growth. 
 
                                                 
17 William Rosenau, “Al Qaida Recruitment Trends in Kenya and Tanzania,” Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism 28 (2005), pp. 1-10. 
18 Kenneth Pollack, “Five Ways to Win Back Iraq,” New York Times, July 1, 2005. 
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For its part the Iraqi government hopes to put the country on a new 
course as outlined in its National Development Strategy (NDS).19  Simply put, 
the Iraqi Government’s vision is to “transform Iraq into a peaceful, unified 
federal democracy and a prosperous, market oriented regional economic 
powerhouse that is fully integrated into the global economy. While few would 
fault these objectives, in reality the NDS represents only cosmetic changes in 
the original set of neoliberal reforms.  
 
Figure 2 











































































Unfortunately the NDS is another top – down approach, based on the 
same faulty assumptions underlying the neoliberal/Washington Consensus 
programs. Perhaps even worse, expectations for a better life were raised with 
                                                 
19 Iraq’s Strategic Vision for National Development: Presented to the International Conference 
on Iraq, Brussels, Belgium 21-22 June 2005 (Baghdad: Ministry of Planning and Development 
Cooperation, 2005). 
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the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The continuation of a failed strategy most 
Iraqis have little influence over for change has in other contexts created an 
environment ripe for extremists.20  
 
Also surprising, despite the presence of all a whole spectrum of socio-
economic factors contributing to extremism, is the absence of any mention in 
the NDS of this phenomena. Neither in terms of its threat to the country’s 
future or the manner in which the Plan hopes to counter it.   As the US 
counterinsurgency efforts have largely overlooked the potential contribution 
that could be made through proper aid based socio-economic policies, it 
appears the country’s socio-economic planners have followed suit. 
 
As in the case of Ken Pollack’s question concerning the security situation 
in Iraq -- Is the situation hopeless? In the economic area a one arrives at a 
similar answer.  An effective economic strategy is not in place. Other than a 
few merchants, no real constituency with a stake in the system is being 
created.  For the large segments of the population untouched by pockets of 
economic improvement, resentment and frustration create an ideal 
environment for extremist recruitment.   
 
As noted above, the counter argument that if it wasn’t for the 
insurgency’s economic sabotage the economy would be doing much better has 
merit. The fact however is that by its nature the neoliberal system is optimal at 
promoting long term growth, not in providing a short-term stimulus with 
significant job creation.   Even under optimal conditions, it was unreasonable 
to expect the surge in investment to begin immediately after the reforms were 
introduced.  In many of the Eastern and Central European countries it took four 
or five years under much more favorable conditions for the private sector to 
begin to undertake significant levels of investment. Even for the medium term, 
the situation as demonstrated by the experience of Latin America noted above, 
a surge in investment and job creation was also problematical.  
Components of a Comprehensive Development Strategy for Iraq 
As things stand in Iraq, many Coalition programs are not having much of an 
impact at the household level. The neoliberal reforms noted above are a top-town 
approach towards the economy, with often little trickling down.  On the other hand 
many infrastructure projects carried out are not necessarily the ones the Iraqis 
themselves would have opted for given a significant input into the decision making 
process.  While employment is created by these projects none are really the part of an 
overriding development strategy geared to meeting specific objectives that the Iraqis 
themselves would have necessarily opted for.   
                                                 
20 Cf. Robert Looney, “Failed Economic Take-Offs and Terrorism in Pakistan,” Asian Survey, 
XLIV:6 (November/December 2004), pp.771-793. 
 11 of 19 
In other words, there is a large disconnect with what goes on at the macro 
levels and at the project level.  Part of this stems from the fact that the country has no 
real development strategy – documents abound, but none of these approaches the 
country’s economic recovery and growth in a systematic, integrated manner.  As result 
and because the Iraqis have had very little significant input into the process it is not 
clear that existing or proposed programs are efficient in any meaningful way in 
meeting the average citizen’s needs. For this reason many Iraqis feel alienated with 
little stake in the current system.  The indirect stimulus from the neoliberal reforms is 
not impacting on their lives and the direct impact stemming from individual 
reconstruction projects is not sufficient to make significant impacts on their standards 
of living.   
 
Fortunately the historical record supplies some general principles to bear in 
mind in designing a fresh development strategy for Iraq:21 
 
1. In practice, growth spurts are associated with a narrow range of policy reforms.  
One of the most encouraging aspects of the comparative evidence on 
economic growth is that it often takes very little to get growth started. In fact, 
relatively small changes in the background environment can yield significant 
increases in economic activity. This is good news for Iraq because it suggests 
that the country need not introduce an extensive set of institutional reforms to 
start growing. This reflects the fact that given the country is far below its 
potential level of income even moderate movements in the right direction can 
produce a big growth payoff. 
 
2. The policy reforms that are associated with these growth transitions typically 
combine elements of orthodoxy with unorthodox institutional practices. No 
country has experienced rapid growth without minimal adherence to the 
higher-order principles of sound economic governance—property rights, 
market-oriented incentives, sound money and fiscal solvency.  However, as the 
Iraqi record shows these policies are usually not sufficient by themselves to set 
off a cumulative growth process. In nearly all successful instances of growth 
this basic policy environment was combined with public intervention and 
selectivity of some sort. In nearly all cases this intervention was unorthodox and 
designed to take into account certain unique aspects of the local environment. 
 
3. Institutional innovations do not travel well. The more discouraging aspects of 
development strategies is that the policy packages associated with growth 
accelerations—and particularly the elements therein that are non-standard—
tend to vary considerably from country to country.  Attempts to emulate 
successful policies elsewhere often fail. 
 
4. Sustaining growth is more difficult than igniting it, and requires more extensive 
institutional reform. The historical record shows that the majority of growth 
spurts  tend to run out of gas after a while. Hence growth in the short-to 
medium term does not guarantee success in the long-term. He experience of 
                                                 
21 Dani Rodrik, “Growth Strategies,” John F. Kennedy School of Government (August 2004), pp. 
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Latin America since the early 1980s and the even more dramatic collapse of 
Sub-Saharan Africa are emblematic of this phenomenon.  A plausible 
interpretation is that the initial reforms need to be deepened over time with 
efforts aimed at strengthening the institutional underpinning of market 
economies. 
 
With these general guidelines in mind, it is possible to sketch out a economic 
development strategy in a manner consistent with reducing the pull of extremists.  
Briefly, three aspects of the reform program are critical.  First the strategy will have to 
incorporate the main problems associated with each of the five views of the economy 
noted above.  Failure to do so will leave gaps in the strategy likely to undermine 
positive developments in other areas – unaddressed structural conditions will increase 
the likelihood of growth being unsustainable.   
 
Second, is there a credible approach that addresses the main deficiencies 
of neoliberalism?    While the conventional wisdom at the beginning of the 
1990s was that no credible alternative existed, that is no longer the case. Much 
of the current thinking on the factors needed for a successful development 
strategy come out of the experience of the Transition countries in the 1990s.  
The experience of transition shows that the neoliberal policies of liberalization, 
stabilization and privatization that are not grounded in adequate institutions 
may not deliver successful outcomes. As Professor Roland notes: 
 
Thus there has been a shift in emphasis from markets and price theory to 
contracting and to the legal, social and political environment of 
contracting. Transition has not only helped to reinforce this change of 
focus in economic thinking, it has also renewed interest in thinking 
about the interplay and complementarities between the various 
constitutive institutions of capitalism. Finally, transition has forced us to 
think about institutions not in a static way, but in a dynamic way: how 
momentum for reform is created, how institutions can evolve but also 
how momentum can be lost, and how one can get stuck in inefficient 
institutions. In this sense, transition has reinforced what I would call the 
evolutionary-institutionalist perspective, insisting both on the 
environment of agents at any moment in time but also in its evolutions. 
22 
In Iraq’s case, the most important differences between the two 
paradigms are no doubt related to their flexibility in adapting to unanticipated 
developments. For the Neoliberal approach, the political economy emphasis is, 
as was the case, in Iraq in 2003 to use early windows of opportunity of periods 
of “exceptional politics” to push reforms through as fast as possible and to 
create irreversibility. 23  
                                                 
22 Gerard Roland, “Ten Years After…Transition Economics,” IMF Staff Papers 48 (2001), pp. 29-52. 
23 Gerard Roland, “Ten Years After…Transition Economics,” IMF Staff Papers 48 (2001), pp. 29-52. 
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The new institutionalists view this strategy as dangerous locking 
countries while countries in into inefficient economic structures that are hard 
to reverse because of the irreversibilities created.  The emphasis is rather on 
ensuring a continuous and growing support for reforms among the population. 
This implies a more gradual and experimental approach to reforms, relying on 
the flexibility of experimentation with an adequate sequencing of reforms to 
possibly reverse reforms that do not work and try other ones. 24 
 
Certainly a shift from the neoliberal paradigm to the new institutionalist 
model of development is called for in Iraq.  However, given the large number of 
degrees of freedom, it makes the most sense at this point in time to simply 
sketch out a broad approach to reform. The presumption is that within this 
framework there is ample scope for modification, and while some measures 
might improve the likelihood of a liberal market economy eventually thriving in 
the country, implementing the complete set of actions is not critical in this 
regard. Instead, given the security situation and desire to combat the pull of 
extremists it is better to focus on a few high impact policies. 
 
Third and building upon the new institutionalist model, Iraq’s strategy will have 
to be one that is capable of creating a virtuous circle, with progress in one area 
creating incentives/pressure for progress in other areas.  In short, economic programs, 
projects and reforms will have to be designed capable of creating sufficient 
momentum to overcome the physical, economic, demographic, networking and 
political impediments to growth.  Here, corruption and the stake many have in 
maintaining the current system are particular obstacles. As long as the current set of 
reforms remain stalled, the more entrenched those opposing reforms will become.  
 
Fourth, the various elements of the development strategy must interact as a 
coherent whole with each element reinforcing the others.  Several key supporting 
elements stand out: (1) an oil fund distributed to the population at large, (2) a dual-
track strategy that focuses on both the development of the formal and informal 
segments of the economy, (3) the reorientation of reconstruction towards community 
development and (4) a reorganization of aid delivery mechanisms and an expansion to 
assist the funding of (2 and (4).  
 
 Fifth, implementation will require the expansion of several existing programs: 25 
The Local Governance Project (LGP) 
The LGP program represents an ambitious attempt at establishing 
democratic governance in Iraq. Specifically, the program’s goal is the 
establishment of local institutions that are representative, responsive and 
capable of addressing citizens’ needs and desires.  To this end, the creation of 
                                                 
24 Gerard Roland, “Ten Years After…Transition Economics,” IMF Staff Papers 48 (2001), pp. 29-52. 
25 Thanks to LtCol John P Boland (CE G5 G&E Econ Officer) for providing valuable insights and the basic 
documents pertaining to the current situation in Iraq.  
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social capital — the creation of links across different social, religious and ethnic 
groups is also a major objective of this program.   
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 
The purpose of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) is to 
provide commanders with a means to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction assistance that can be implemented quickly and have an immediate 
impact on the Iraqi people. 26 This is a creative and important program designed to 
provide U.S. governmental appropriations directly to tactical units for the purpose of 
meeting emergency needs of local Iraqi civilians (a similar program exists in 
Afghanistan).   
 
With most projects averaging $50,000 CERP provides a quick and effective 
method that provides immediate, positive impact on the Iraqi people, while other 
larger reconstruction projects are still getting off the ground. The key to project 
selection is:  (1) execute quickly; (2) employ many Iraqis; (3) benefit the Iraqi people 
and (4) may be highly visible. 27 
Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) 
OTI’s strategic objective, “political transition successfully advanced in 
priority, conflict-prone countries,” is the basis for the short-term, flexible 
and rapid assistance it provides in transitional settings. OTI’s support during 
transitions to peace and democracy and transitional political crisis has the 
potential to help create a strong foundation for longer-term targeted 
development programs. This program has been greatly under-funded, yet 
has the potential to play a critical role in Iraq, especially if it is closely 
coordinated with the in conjunction with LGP programs and the CERP. 
 
 Summarizing the proposed strategy: 
 
1. Shifting from a neoliberal/Washington Consensus development strategy to one 
along neo-institutionalist lines as done in several of the Transition countries 
would reorient the development process in a manner encompassing more 
groups into the country’s decision making and development process.  
 
2. In contrast the neoliberal approach of relying on a whole spectrum of reforms, 
the neoliberal approach would shift attention to certain key areas critical to the 
building up of a momentum for further reforms. 
  
3. Instead of the neoliberal stress on liberalization, stabilization and privatization, 
the evolutionary approach focuses on creating the institutional underpinnings 
of markets needed to insure strong entrepreneurial development.  
 
                                                 
26 CERP Family of Funds: Fiscal Policies, Processes, and Standard Operating Procedures (Baghdad: 
Multinational Corps-Iraq, June 29, 2005), p. 2. 
27 CERP Family of Funds: Fiscal Policies, Processes, and Standard Operating Procedures (Baghdad: 
Multinational Corps-Iraq, June 29, 2005), p. 4. 
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4. While the neoliberal approach has focused on creating a clean slate by breaking 
up existing state structure, the institutional approach would attempt to use 
existing institutions to prevent further economic disruption and social unrest 
while developing new institutions. 
 
5. A community development based development strategy fits into this general 
framework enabling Iraqis to participate in designing programs and policies in 
tune with their direct needs.  The result would be better project selection, 
completion, and satisfaction, lessening the pull of extremist groups.28  
 
6. The community based strategy should be focused not just on deriving local 
development plans to be funded through redirected aid allocations. A key 
element of this strategy is to gradually repair the social capital linkages 
destroyed by the previous regime. Starting at the local level and expanding to 
the region and eventually the national level, networks would strengthen not 
only the workings of the economic system, but also assist in the creation of a 
viable Iraqi state. 
 
7. In shifting towards a community development based strategy, programs at the 
local level should build on three highly successful programs, but to date vastly 
under-funded: (a) the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), (b) 
the Local Governance Project (LGP) and Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI).  
 
8. These three programs have largely operated independently, but should be 
closely coordinated and their orientation (mainly CERP) expanded to allow the 
funding of private sector projects. There is some evidence that there has been 
an over expansion in certain areas – schools, and other public sector activities.  
At this time the biggest impact per dollar will come from assisting the 
establishment of private, labor-intensive start up companies. 
  
9. Distributing a certain percentage of oil revenues to the Iraqi public through the 
creation of an oil fund, would provide added demand for a wide range of 
domestic consumer goods. Part of this payment to Iraqis could be made 
conditional on participation in local clean-up programs while short-term 
training programs were providing the skills needed by private companies. 
 
10. A Development Bank should be established, and funded by an additional share 
of oil revenues. This would be a temporary to allow time for the commercial 
banking system to gain the expertise to eventually perform this function. The 
bank would specialize in small loans to start-up companies, encouraging the 
participation of women in the economy.  
 
11. A goal of the newly created Development Bank would be regional balance with 
lending oriented toward a fairly even distribution of new firms across the 
country. 
                                                 
28 The rational for a community development oriented approach has been developed by  Jason Ben-Meier. 
See his “Create a New Era of Islamic-Western Relations by Supporting Community Development,” 
Strategic Insights III:4 (April 2004). 
 16 of 19 
 
12. Within this context, the shift to a dual track development strategy with a focus 
on supporting small-and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) would draw many 
entrepreneurs out of the informal sector, further assisting in the creation of 
new firms and associated employment.  
 
13. Two areas of governance are critical for the private sector to take hold and 
thrive in Iraq: secure property rights and an improved rule of law. In the past 
deterioration in the rule of law and related institutional enforcement 
mechanisms has shifted the balance of incentives toward participation in the 
informal economy. 
 
14. Improved macroeconomic stability will be critical in providing the right price 
incentives for private sector investment and activity. With growth inflationary 
pressures, the government will need to develop an improved stabilization tools, 
perhaps starting with an oil stabilization fund to better smooth out 
expenditures, avoiding short run bursts of disruptive austerity measures. 
 
15. In Iraq’s case, large allocations of assistance should be directed to two key 
areas noted above – small scale enterprise development and community 
development. Particularly in the case of community development the use of 
grants should be seriously considered.  As the Meltzer commission observed, 
this provides a more effective means of monitoring projects and providing 
incentives to recipients.   
 
16. Progress, as judged by annual independent audit, of stipulated outputs. This 
and other safe-guards might also help assure that community programs would 
not be taken over or reoriented by extremist groups. 
 
17. Once the process is underway, several links between added employment and 
further demand creation would reinforce in a virtuous cycle-type mechanism 
the employment creation capability of the economy.  
 
18. Most importantly, with the creation and expansion of a new class of 
entrepreneurs and those with a stake in seeing the reform process move ahead. 
 
19.  Further reforms, the reduction of corruption and the creation of and expansion 
of extended networks would build up the momentum to hopefully assure the 
viability and continuance of a liberal market economy. 
  
Taken as a whole these policy initiatives have the potential of not only 
significantly expanding domestic employment opportunities, but perhaps more 
importantly doing so through the creation of a virtuous cycle with feedbacks between 
the domestic market, further reforms and the labor markets (Figure 3).   
 
Community development programs should be started and greatly expanded in 
those areas security permitting.  Local participation, project identification and 
implementation are the most rapid way to attack the current unemployment problems 
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while reducing the insurgency threat.  Iraqis must feel they have a real stake in the 
future and that it is within their control. 
 
In terms of timing, the first priority should be to expand and build on existing, 
successful programs.  While a number of these programs exist, the CERP program 
stands out and should have a significant increase in its funding.  There is a growing 
consensus that if this program had had more funding all along we would not be in the 
mess we are now.  The program should be modified slightly to assure its support of 
overall community development programs. In addition, expanding CERP’s scope to 
include the funding of private sector ventures would probably be the quickest way to 
obtain an immediate impact on Iraqi jobs and incomes.  The capability exists in CERP 
for this broadened responsibility. 
Figure 3 
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Second, the other two programs mentioned above, LGP and OTI, should also be 
greatly expanded and their efforts coordinated with the CERP. There has been a 
natural tendency for LGP and OTI programs to be absent from areas where security is 
an issue.  Teaming them up with CERP is one way of extending their presence to areas 
of potentially high impact. The close coordination of these two programs with CERP 
could provide the needed security for the continuity needed to develop and implement 
quick action programs meeting the needs of the average Iraqi. However, the joining of 
forces of CERP, LGP, and OTI is not a natural one and will require some creativity in 
focusing the strengths of each on a common course of action – results will easily 
justify the effort. 
 
Third, work is underway concerning the rule of law and property rights. This 
should be given a higher priority and additional resources for speedy resolution. The 
remainder of the programs noted above – Development Bank, Oil Fund, Dual 
Development/Informal economy credit programs can be gradually phased in as 
funding and personnel permit. They are needed programs to sustain the momentum 
built up by expanded CERP, LGP and OTI efforts. 
Assessment 
As noted a whole spectrum of factors affect terrorist recruitment. 
Interviews with members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, suggest these groups 
actively recruit to fill potential leadership positions while relying more heavily 
on volunteers to carryout martyrdom attacks and general foot soldier 
functions.29 There is little to suggest the situation is fundamentally different for 
extremist groups operating in Iraq.  
 
Thus for large numbers of Iraqis a poor economic environment and lack 
of other profitable economic activity can be a major factor in their decision to 
join a extremist organization.  The other options are service in the Iraqi 
Police/military or criminal activity. For many Sunnis the options are only criminal 
activity or an extremist group. Former Ba’athists and Iraqi military often find 
their options are even narrower in today’s Iraq.   
 
The job-oriented community development strategy has the potential to 
marginalize extremists by strengthening indigenous democratic processes that 
generate economic prosperity.    
 
Community empowerment occurs through a gradual, nonviolent, and 
generally accepted process because of the collective and individual 
benefits the community experience.  As people achieve their own 
interests, they feel less alienation; their zone of tolerance expands, 
because the underlying conditions that fuel extremism are being 
addressed. Those affected then are less likely to channel hatred toward 
                                                 
29 Nasra Hassan, “An Arsenal of Believers: Talking to the Human Bombs,” The New Yorker 
(November 19, 2001). 
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outside actors or allow themselves to be used as tools of destruction. 
Additionally in the Muslim world, as the majority of people in 
communities, regions, and nations come to enjoy the benefits of the 
local development approach, the more they will be emboldened to fight 
extremism within their own countries. 30  
 
For a smaller group of Iraqis, community development and increased prosperity 
may not be a sufficient step. Disaffected youth are the main recruits into terrorist 
organizations.  Experts cite a series of factors, ranging from social deprivation, to 
cultural disenchantment and a sense of deep injustice harbored by many Muslims.   
 
People turn to fundamentalist ideology (and perhaps at some stage to 
violence), says Oliver Roy, a French researcher on Islamist movements, because 
it “appeals to an uprooted, disaffected youth in search of an identity beyond 
the lost cultures of their parents and beyond the thwarted expectations of a 
better life.”31 
 
Roy’s observations may have been quite true before the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein.  Since that time, however the occupation of Iraq and the dire state of affairs 
there have produced a new pool of potential recruits for extremist groups. Within Iraq, 
former Ba’thists, ex-Military officers, and Sunnis feeling excluded from the country’s 
futgure, and others resenting the U.S. presence will somehow have to be integrated 
back into Iraqi society and political system.    
 
Outside of Iraq, Jihadist leaders who in the past pointed to Palestine or to the 
United States’ enforcement of the U.S. embargo of Iraq and America’s “cultural 
aggression” against Muslim lands never generated that many recruits.  The invasion of 
Iraq has incensed even many moderate Muslims to take action.32  
 
To further stem the “Iraq effect” on extremist recruitment in Iraq and other 
countries, the U.S. will not only have to eventually withdraw from that country, but it 
must withdraw leaving the start of democratic institutions and a viable, dynamic 
economy capable of including and benefiting broad segments of the population. 
While hard core religious fanatics will be largely unaffected by these actions, success in 
Iraq may represent the most effective long-run strategy to stem the pull of extremist 
groups in Iraq and throughout the Middle East.  This is not necessarily an impossible 
task, but it is one that will require much more thought, acceptance of prior mistakes,   
planning, and encouragement of Iraqi input than has occurred in the past.  
                                                 
30 Jason Ben-Meir, “Creating a New Era of Islamic-Western Relations by Supporting Community 
Development,” Mediterranean Quarterly, 15:3 (Summer 2004), p.46.  
31 Roula Khalaf, “Disaffected Youths Find Identity in fundamentalist Ideology,” Financial Times 
(July 13, 2005). 
32 “Net Assessment: the Jihadism Movement,” Stratfor (November 26, 2004). 
